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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. JURISDICTION 
 
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company appeals from a 
final judgment entered in favor of appellee, John D. Shade, 
on October 22, 1997, pursuant to a jury verdict for Shade 
in the amount of $870,000, and from the denial of its 
renewed motion to alter or amend the judgment, or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial entered on November 19, 1997. 
The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 
U.S.C. S 1331, and this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded Great Lakes 
a contract to dredge and renourish the beach at Cape May, 
New Jersey, which Great Lakes began performing on 
November 12, 1994. This project consisted of removing 
sand from the ocean floor at offshore locations and 
transferring the sand to the beach through 6600 feet of 
steel pipe, known as the submersible line. See  app. at 637- 
40. The dredge Long Island removed the sand from the 
ocean floor; and once its hopper compartments were full, 
the tug Conlon propelled the dredge to a self-contained 
offshore transfer station buoy ("scots buoy"), a large round 
floating buoy secured by four anchors. See id.  at 337, 689. 
In order to transport the sand to the beach, the dredge 
would secure itself to a pipe attached to the scots buoy 
which in turn was connected to the submersible line. The 
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dredge then would pump its load of sand into the pipe and 
through the submersible line. Upon reaching the beach, the 
submersible line ended at a "Y" valve. This valve, which 
controlled the flow of the sand, connected the submersible 
line to an additional line, known as the shore line, 
extending in both directions along the beach parallel to the 
ocean. As the sand flowed out of either end of the shore 
line, bulldozers positioned the sand on the beach according 
to a predetermined plan. 
 
Shade arrived at the Cape May worksite on the night of 
December 8, 1994, and began to work for Great Lakes at 
the site on December 9, 1994. See id. at 472. Since 1974, 
Shade had been employed by various companies to assist 
in such dredging projects; and in the four years prior to his 
injury, the majority of his work had been with Great Lakes. 
See id. at 468-69. Shade received his work assignments 
through his union, Local 25, Marine Division, International 
Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO. When he was 
unemployed, Shade would place his name on the out-of- 
work list until Local 25 assigned him to a new job. See id. 
at 346-48, 519-20. 
 
Great Lakes previously employed Shade from September 
1992 until February 1994. See id. at 54-55, 509-10. 
However, beginning in March 1994, Shade worked for 
Bean-Weeks Joint Venture, another dredging contractor, as 
a deckhand. See id. at 55, 510. Bean-Weeks subsequently 
fired Shade, and he remained without work until Great 
Lakes hired him for the Cape May job. 
 
Great Lakes asserted that it hired Shade for Cape May as 
a shoreman, see id. at 648, pursuant to its contract with 
Local 25 which mandated the hiring of a shoreman for this 
type of job. See id. at 69, 684-87. In fact, Great Lakes' 
superintendent, David P. Rappe, and the Local 25 union 
steward, Cecil C. Jackson, Sr., both testified that Great 
Lakes hired Shade as a shoreman. See id. at 687, 794; see 
also id. at 648 (testimony of deck captain James D. Joyner), 
772-73 (testimony of shoreman Joseph H. Gurganus). 
 
Shade, on the other hand, contended that Great Lakes 
hired him as a deckhand assigned to the anchor barge 110, 
which assisted in the dredging operation, see id. at 479, 
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and that the shore gang was already in place when he 
arrived to work at Cape May. See id. at 472. Both Shade 
and his supervisor, Mark Oldham, testified that he was 
employed primarily on the navigable waters off Cape May. 
See id. at 316-17, 473-84. In fact, Oldham testified that 
Shade was on the water 90% of the time that he worked at 
the Cape May project. See id. at 316-17. 
 
When Shade arrived at Cape May, the submersible line 
had been laid, the scots buoy was in place, and the Long 
Island had begun to dig the first portion of sand from the 
ocean floor. See id. at 473, 642-43, 681-83, 793-94. The 
dredge filled its hoppers and connected to the scots buoy, 
but it was not able to pump the sand to the beach because 
of a hole in the submersible line. See id. at 157. As a result, 
from December 9th, when Shade began to work at Cape 
May, until the early morning hours of December 13th, 
Shade worked on the water assisting in the repair of the 
submersible line, see id. at 690-92, while assigned to 
anchor barge 110. See id. at 473-75. 
 
After the workers completed the repair of the submersible 
line, the Long Island once again had the capacity to pump 
sand to the beach. However, between December 13th and 
December 30th, the dredge only operated from the evening 
of December 19th until December 22nd and from the 
evening of December 25th until December 30th because of 
poor weather conditions. See id. at 249-66, 694-99. Great 
Lakes presented evidence that during the periods of bad 
weather, Shade remained on the beach, assisting welders 
and waiting on standby in case the weather cleared. See id. 
at 601-02, 699-700, 745-46. Shade, on the other hand, 
contended that during poor weather he would work in the 
harbor which was protected from the rough seas. See id. at 
311-14. For instance, Shade testified that he helped 
construct a second submersible line, see id. at 480, and 
assisted in repairing the scots buoy. See id.  at 558-59; see 
also id. at 305-15 (testimony of Oldham). 
 
Great Lakes offered testimony that when the dredge was 
able to pump sand to the beach, Shade performed the work 
of a shoreman on the beach. See id. at 695-99. For 
example, Shade assisted welders in securing the shore line, 
operated the "Y" valve, and put fuel in welding machines. 
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See id. at 536-37, 769. Shade disputed Great Lakes' 
account of his work between December 19th and December 
22nd, and testified that he worked on the water during that 
period. See id. at 556. However, he did not dispute that he 
primarily worked on the beach performing these shore 
based duties from December 25th until December 30th. See 
id. 
 
While working on the beach on December 30th, Shade 
assisted Oldham in refueling a welding machine, a 
procedure which required lifting the machine with a front- 
end loader. See id. at 485-87. While Oldham was operating 
the loader, the raised claw of the loader dropped 
unexpectedly and severed Shade's thumb. See id.  at 486- 
88. Shade testified that even though doctors were able to 
reattach his thumb, see id. at 491, he basically has no use 
of the thumb, see id. at 501-02, and could not return to 
work in his prior capacity. See id. at 502-03. 
 
After initially receiving benefits under the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. S 901 et seq. 
("LHWCA"), Shade filed a complaint against Great Lakes on 
January 31, 1997, seeking damages under the Jones Act, 
46 U.S.C. app. S 688(a), and the general maritime law 
doctrine of unseaworthiness. On September 8, 1997, Great 
Lakes filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that Shade was not a seaman. The district court denied this 
motion without opinion on September 24, 1997. On 
October 7, 1997, Great Lakes filed a motion in limine to 
preclude testimony at trial regarding Shade's prior 
employment with Great Lakes. The district court, however, 
deferred ruling on the motion and at the trial ultimately 
permitted Shade to introduce evidence of his prior 
employment. See app. at 54-55, 509-10. 
 
A jury trial began on October 14, 1997, solely on the 
Jones Act claim. At the conclusion of the presentation of 
Shade's evidence, Great Lakes moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50 for a judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the 
evidence did not establish that Shade was a seaman at the 
time of his injury. See app. at 41, 589. However, the district 
court deferred ruling on that motion. See id.  at 589. Great 
Lakes renewed its Rule 50 motion at the conclusion of all 
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of the evidence, see id. at 45, 844; and again, the district 
court deferred its ruling. See id. at 844. 
 
The district court submitted a series of special 
interrogatories to the jury; and on October 21, 1997, the 
jury found that Shade was a seaman, and returned a 
verdict in his favor in the amount of $870,000. See id. at 
946-47. Pursuant to this verdict, the district court entered 
judgment against Great Lakes on October 22, 1997. See id. 
at 7. Great Lakes subsequently filed a renewed motion to 
alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(b), or, in the alternative, for a new trial under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 59. See app. at 7. However, the district court denied 
this motion on November 19, 1997, and Great Lakesfiled 
its timely notice of appeal on December 18, 1997. See id. at 
7, 9. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Jones Act Seaman Status 
 
The Jones Act provides that "[a]ny seaman who shall 
suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, 
at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with 
the right of trial by jury." 46 U.S.C. app. S 688(a). However, 
the Jones Act does not define the critical term"seaman" 
and thus "leaves to the courts the determination of exactly 
which maritime workers are entitled to admiralty's special 
protection." Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 355, 115 
S.Ct. 2172, 2183 (1995). In a recent series of opinions, the 
Supreme Court has clarified this definition and has 
provided guidance as to how courts are to interpret this key 
term. See Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 
117 S.Ct. 1535 (1997); Chandris, 515 U.S. 347, 115 S.Ct. 
2172; Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 112 
S.Ct. 486 (1991); McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 
337, 111 S.Ct. 807 (1991). 
 
In developing a test for seaman status, the Court noted 
that prior cases recognized "a fundamental distinction 
between land-based and sea-based maritime employees." 
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 359, 115 S.Ct. at 2185. In 
enunciating this difference, the Court has focused"on the 
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nature of the seaman's service, his status as a member of 
the vessel, and his relationship as such to the vessel and 
its operation in navigable waters," id. at 359-60, 115 S.Ct. 
at 2185, and not on the situs of injury, because"land- 
based maritime workers do not become seamen because 
they happen to be working on board a vessel when they are 
injured, and seamen do not lose Jones Act protection when 
the course of their service to a vessel takes them ashore." 
Id. at 361, 115 S.Ct. at 2186; see also Wilander, 498 U.S. 
at 355, 111 S.Ct. at 817 ("The key to seaman status . . . is 
employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation."). 
The rule as developed by the Supreme Court furthers the 
important goal of ensuring that a worker does "not oscillate 
back and forth between Jones Act coverage and other 
remedies depending on the activity in which the worker was 
engaged while injured." Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363, 115 
S.Ct. at 2187. 
 
From these basic principles, the Court in Chandris set 
forth a two-part test to determine if an individual is entitled 
to Jones Act protection as a seaman: 
 
       First, as we emphasized in Wilander, `an employee's 
       duties must "contribut[e] to the function of the vessel 
       or to the accomplishment of its mission.' " The Jones 
       Act's protections, like the other admiralty protections 
       for seamen, only extend to those maritime employees 
       who do the ship's work. . . . 
 
       Second, . . . a seaman must have a connection to a 
       vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such 
       vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its 
       duration and nature. 
 
Id. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 2190 (citations omitted). The Court 
also noted that although "seaman status is not merely a 
temporal concept, . . . it necessarily includes a temporal 
element." Id. at 371, 115 S.Ct. at 2191. In fact, both 
portions of the Chandris test contain such an element, 
because a court must determine how broad a time period to 
consider when evaluating both an employee's duties and 
his or her connection to a vessel in navigation. 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In addition, the second portion of the test contains a direct 
measurement of time through its durational element. 
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In its appeal, Great Lakes focuses on this temporal 
concept. Specifically, Great Lakes argues that in evaluating 
an employee's duties under the initial prong of the seaman 
status test, the fact-finder must consider only the activities 
of an employee at the time of his or her injury. Great Lakes 
maintains that under this interpretation it is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law, because it contends that 
Shade was not acting as a seaman at the time of his injury. 
Alternatively, with respect to the latter portion of the 
seaman status test, Great Lakes asserts that only evidence 
regarding the employee's present assignment with his or 
her current employer is relevant and admissible to 
establish a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation. 
Thus, Great Lakes argues that if it does not receive a 
judgment as a matter of law, it is entitled to a new trial 
because the district court permitted Shade to introduce 
evidence regarding his prior employment history. 
 
After considering these arguments, we hold that Great 
Lakes is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law with 
respect to Shade's seaman status, because Shade 
presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for 
the jury to consider. However, we will reverse the judgment 
entered against Great Lakes, and remand this case to the 
district court for a new trial, because the district court 
abused its discretion to admit evidence regarding Shade's 
prior employment history.2 
 
B. Duties Of The Employee 
 
Under the first portion of the Chandris seaman status 
test, an employee must demonstrate that his or her duties 
" `contribute to the function of the vessel or to the 
accomplishment of its mission.' " 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. 
at 2190 (citation omitted). In satisfying this requirement, 
the seaman does not have to aid the vessel in navigation, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Great Lakes also raised a number of other issues in its appeal, such 
as the failure to hold a charge conference, the alleged inadequacy of the 
district court's jury charge, and the lack of a set-off against the 
judgment for the amounts Shade received under the LHWCA; however, 
we will not reach these issues on this appeal as their resolution could 
not affect our result. 
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see Wilander, 498 U.S. at 353, 111 S.Ct. at 816; rather, the 
employee must merely "perform the work of the vessel." Id. 
at 355, 111 S.Ct. at 817.3 While this part of the Chandris 
test does not contain any express time component, such an 
element is implied, because a court must determine how 
broad a time period to consider when evaluating an 
employee's duties. Great Lakes argues for a narrow time 
limitation, stating that a court is to determine the seaman 
status of an employee solely based on "the activity in which 
he was engaged at the time of injury." Desper v. Starved 
Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187, 190, 72 S.Ct. 216, 218 
(1952); see also Heise v. Fishing Co., 79 F.3d 903, 906-07 
(9th Cir. 1996) ("The fact that if Heise performed well he 
might be hired to work on the ship when it left Seward if 
there were jobs available does not change his land-based 
status at the time the injury occurred." (emphasis added)). 
Applying this standard to the facts in this case, Great 
Lakes contends that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law, because Shade was ashore assisting in the refueling 
of a welding machine when he was injured. 
 
The question of seaman status is often "fact specific," and 
"[i]f reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standard, 
could differ as to whether the employee was a `member of 
a crew,' it is a question for the jury." Wilander, 498 U.S. at 
356, 111 S.Ct. at 818. However, "a directed verdict is 
mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably 
support only one conclusion." Id. This court utilizes a 
plenary standard to review a grant or denial of a judgment 
as a matter of law. See Salas v. Wang, 846 F.2d 897, 902 
(3d Cir. 1988). A court should grant such a motion only "if, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Court in Wilander definitively resolved the "inconsistent use of an 
aid in navigation requirement" that arose between 1927 and 1946, 
"during which [time] the Court did not recognize the mutual exclusivity 
of the [LHWCA] and the Jones Act." Id.  at 348, 111 S.Ct. at 814. The 
Court explained that "the better rule" was to define seaman status 
"solely in terms of the employee's connection to a vessel in navigation." 
Id. at 354, 111 S.Ct. at 817. This rule would ensure that the Jones Act 
would fulfill the purpose of protecting "[a]ll who work at sea in the 
service of a ship [and who] face those particular perils to which the 
protection of maritime law, statutory as well as decisional, is directed." 
Id. 
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viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from 
which a jury reasonably could find liability." Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Although the contours of the seaman status test remain 
difficult to apply, the Supreme Court has provided a 
number of relevant principles to guide our determination of 
this issue. First, the Court has emphasized that its status- 
based approach to the definition of the term seaman 
"determines Jones Act coverage without regard to the 
precise activity in which the worker is engaged at the time 
of the injury." Chandris, 515 U.S. at 358, 115 S.Ct. at 
2185; see also id. at 363, 115 S.Ct. at 2187 ("[C]ourts 
should not employ `a `snapshot' test for seaman status, 
inspecting only the situation as it exists at the instant of 
injury; a more enduring relationship is contemplated in the 
jurisprudence.' " (quoting Easley v. Southern Shipbuilding 
Corp., 965 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1992))). By not focusing 
exclusively on the activity of the employee at the time of 
injury, courts prevent a worker from oscillating"between 
Jones Act coverage and other remedies depending on the 
activity in which the worker was engaged while injured." Id. 
at 363, 115 S.Ct. at 2187. 
 
For instance, in Thibodeaux v. Torch, Inc., 858 F.2d 1048, 
1049 (5th Cir. 1988), the plaintiff sued under the Jones Act 
for injuries he sustained while working ashore. The 
employer argued that it was entitled to summary judgment, 
because the plaintiff 's specific activities at the moment of 
his accident were not the work of a seaman, but rather 
were "traditional" duties of a longshoreman. Id. at 1050. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the 
employer's position and held that the specific activity at the 
time of injury was "only one factor" in the analysis of the 
employee's Jones Act seaman status. Id. at 1051; see also 
Smith v. Odom Offshore Surveys, Inc., 791 F.2d 411, 415 
(5th Cir. 1986); Savoie v. Otto Candies, Inc. , 692 F.2d 363, 
365 (5th Cir. 1982); Guidry v. South La. Contractors, Inc., 
614 F.2d 447, 453 (1980); Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 
545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 
U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 2010 (1978). Thus, contrary to Great 
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Lakes' position, the employee's specific activity at the time 
of his or her injury is not dispositive of the issue of seaman 
status. 
 
Second, although an examination based solely on the 
specific activity at the time of injury is too narrow, the 
Supreme Court also has cautioned against too broad of a 
perspective in examining an employee's duties. In 
evaluating the duties of an employee under the seaman 
status test, courts should not consider an employee's entire 
work history, but must consider only the nature of the 
employee's basic job assignment as it existed at the time of 
injury. After all, as the Court has stated, "[w]hen a 
maritime worker's basic assignment changes, his seaman 
status may change as well." Chandris, 515 U.S. at 372, 115 
S.Ct. at 2191. To illustrate this holding, the Court 
explained: 
 
       For example, we can imagine situations in which 
       someone who had worked for years in an employer's 
       shoreside headquarters is then reassigned to a ship in 
       a classic seaman's job that involves a regular and 
       continuous, rather than intermittent, commitment of 
       the worker's labor to the function of a vessel. Such a 
       person should not be denied seaman status if injured 
       shortly after the reassignment, just as someone 
       actually transferred to a desk job in the company's 
       office and injured in the hallway should not be entitled 
       to claim seaman status on the basis of prior service at 
       sea. 
 
Id. at 372, 115 S.Ct. at 2191. Thus, while a court must not 
concentrate exclusively on the employee's specific activity at 
the time of injury, a court should limit its examination of 
the employee's duties to the employee's basic job 
assignment as it existed at the time of injury. 
 
Applying these principles to the present appeal, we 
cannot say that Great Lakes is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. Although Shade was on shore assisting in 
the refueling of a welding machine when he was injured, 
this activity cannot be the sole determining factor to resolve 
whether Shade was a seaman. Instead, we must view 
Shade's status in the larger context of his employment- 
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related duties. In deciding which duties to consider, a 
reasonable juror could conclude that Shade's entire 
performance at the Cape May job consisted of a single 
assignment, because his duties remained fairly constant 
during the pendency of that dredging operation. Under this 
broader analysis, Shade presented sufficient evidence such 
that a reasonable jury could determine that his duties 
during the Cape May job contributed to the function of a 
vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. While 
working at Cape May, Shade spent a considerable amount 
of his time at the beginning of his employment working on 
the water with the anchor barge 110 to repair the 
submersible line. See app. at 473-75, 690-92. Beyond this 
initial placement, Shade presented evidence at trial that he 
spent significant time on the water as a deckhand on a 
vessel in navigation performing his job responsibilities. See 
id. at 311-14, 316-17, 473-84. Additionally, even Shade's 
duties on the beach were not unrelated to the work of a 
vessel in navigation; instead, they contributed to the 
purpose of the dredging operation. Viewing this evidence in 
a light most favorable to Shade, a reasonable juror could 
find that Shade's job responsibilities at Cape May consisted 
of a single job assignment and contributed to the function 
of a vessel in navigation, thereby satisfying thefirst 
requirement of the Chandris test. Thus, because Shade 
presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find 
in his favor, the district court correctly denied Great Lakes' 
motion for a judgment as a matter of law.4  
 
C. Connection To A Vessel 
 
Under the second part of the Chandris seaman status 
test, an employee must demonstrate that he or she has "a 
connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable 
group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both 
its duration and nature." 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that in making this determination, we do not consider the 
evidence of Shade's prior employment history with Great Lakes, because 
as we hold below, such evidence is inadmissible, and thus cannot be 
considered by a court in deciding a motion for a judgment as a matter 
of law. See Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1198-1200. 
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2190. Typically, this requirement is fulfilled by examining 
the employee's connection with the vessel to which he or 
she was assigned at the time of his or her injury. However, 
in certain circumstances, this connection might not be 
sufficient to meet the substantiality requirement of the 
seaman status test, even though the employee performs 
traditional seaman activities on a regular and continuous 
basis. For example, the employee's job responsibilities 
might require performance on a number of different vessels, 
rather than permitting a permanent connection to one 
vessel. Confronted with this problem, courts have enabled 
employees to fulfill the seaman status test by 
demonstrating that they are assigned to a fleet of vessels, 
rather than to only one vessel, under a doctrine known as 
the "Fleet Seaman Doctrine." See, e.g., Reeves v. Mobile 
Dredging & Pumping Co., 26 F.3d 1247, 1253-55 (3d Cir. 
1994) (describing the development of the doctrine). In fact, 
the Chandris test contemplates this doctrine, because it 
expressly permits an employee to demonstrate a connection 
not only "to a vessel in navigation," but also"to an 
identifiable group of such vessels." 515 U.S. at 368, 115 
S.Ct. at 2190. By permitting this aggregation, the Fleet 
Seaman Doctrine thus ensures that a seaman receives 
Jones Act coverage even though he or she is not assigned 
permanently to a specific vessel, but instead regularly 
performs seaman's work on different vessels. See Gizoni v. 
Southwest Marine Inc., 56 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1995) 
("Under the fleet seaman doctrine, one can acquire `seaman' 
status through permanent assignment to a group of vessels 
under common ownership or control."). 
 
For instance, in Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 
280 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1960), John Braniff worked as 
the "Superintendent in charge of all maintenance, repair 
and overhaul work" for his employer. Id. at 525. In 
performing this job, he would travel from vessel to vessel, 
but would be stationed only temporarily at each vessel. 
Braniff subsequently drowned while repairing a machine on 
one of his employer's ferries. See id. Based on his limited 
contact with the ferry, Braniff could not establish a 
substantial connection to a single vessel in navigation even 
though his job required him to perform seaman's duties on 
a regular and ongoing basis. In holding that Braniff could 
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be a seaman under the Jones Act, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit permitted an aggregation of Braniff 's 
connections to the other vessels in the fleet beyond the 
single ferry he worked on immediately prior to his death, 
because he was " `assigned permanently' " to those vessels 
and performed " `a substantial part of his work on the' 
several specified `vessel(s).' " Id.  at 528 (citing Offshore Co. 
v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959)). 
 
We first considered the Fleet Seaman Doctrine in Reeves, 
26 F.3d at 1256; and after determining that "the doctrine 
comports well with and flows logically from Supreme Court 
precedent," we adopted the doctrine as "the rule of law in 
this circuit in analyzing Jones Act cases." Id. We held that 
"[t]he Fleet Seaman Doctrine in our view applies to an 
employee, one who is predominantly assigned by his 
employer to a navigable vessel, but who occasionally is 
assigned by that same employer to non-navigable vessels. It 
would also apply to one who is assigned to a number of 
navigable vessels and spends some time on shore, as in 
Braniff." Id. Thus, we adopted the doctrine to afford Jones 
Act protection to these types of employees, because 
"stripping seaman status from such an employee, or 
allowing that same employee to oscillate between seaman 
and non-seaman status . . . would be a travesty of justice." 
Id. 
 
In the present case, Shade had worked as a deckhand 
since 1974. See app. at 468. From September 1992 until 
February 1994, Great Lakes employed Shade as a 
deckhand. See id. at 54-55, 509-10. However, beginning in 
March 1994, Shade worked for Bean-Weeks. See id.  at 55, 
510. Great Lakes did not re-employ Shade until December 
1994 for the Cape May job. See id. at 472. During trial, 
Shade sought to introduce evidence regarding his 
employment history under the Fleet Seaman Doctrine in 
order to satisfy the substantiality requirement of the 
Chandris seaman status test. Over the objection of Great 
Lakes, the district court permitted Shade to offer two types 
of prior employment evidence. First, Shade introduced a 
general account of his work history, with Shade testifying 
that he had been working on the water since 1974, see id. 
at 468, and had been a deckhand "all my life," id. at 479, 
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and with three other witnesses testifying that Shade had 
been a deckhand throughout his career. See id.  at 617 
(testimony of Thomas E. Chandler), 660-61 (testimony of 
Joyner), 809 (testimony of Jackson). Second, the district 
court admitted specific evidence regarding Shade's work 
history as a deckhand for Great Lakes from September 
1992 until February 1994. See id. at 54-55, 468-69, 842. 
 
In its appeal, Great Lakes maintains that it is entitled to 
a new trial because this prior employment evidence was not 
relevant to the determination of Shade's seaman status and 
thus should not have been admitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
402.5 We exercise an abuse of discretion standard to review 
"a denial of a request for a new trial based on the district 
court's alleged error in ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence." Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
56 F.3d 521, 525 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Lippay v. Christos, 
996 F.2d 1490, 1496 (3d Cir. 1993)). However, where"the 
district court's decision rests on the application of legal 
precepts, we exercise plenary review." Failla v. City of 
Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1998). We will grant 
Great Lakes a new trial, because we hold that the district 
court abused its discretion in admitting evidence regarding 
Shade's prior work history.6 
 
Even though the Fleet Seaman Doctrine permits an 
employee to aggregate contacts with multiple vessels, it is 
clear that these contacts must have occurred with vessels 
owned or controlled by the same employer. As the Supreme 
Court has stated, "[c]onsidering prior employments with 
independent employers in making the seaman status 
inquiry would undermine `the interests of employers and 
maritime workers alike in being able to predict who will be 
covered by the Jones Act . . . before a particular work day 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Rule 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of 
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court, pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible." 
 
6. Arguably we should exercise plenary review on the evidence issue. Of 
course, if we did, we would reach the same result. Thus, we do not 
prejudice Shade by using an abuse of discretion standard. 
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begins.' " Harbor Tug, 117 S.Ct. at 1541 (quoting Chandris, 
515 U.S. at 363, 115 S.Ct. at 2187). The Court held that 
without such a rule "[t]here would be no principled basis 
for limiting which prior employments are considered for 
determining seaman status." Id.; see also Reeves, 26 F.3d 
at 1257 (rejecting an attempt to introduce evidence of a 
prior employment with another employer under the Fleet 
Seaman Doctrine because the prior employment "was 
simply unrelated" to his present job). 
 
When introducing evidence concerning his general work 
history, Shade and the other witnesses did not state with 
any specificity who employed him during his work career. 
However, undoubtedly at least a portion of this evidence 
concerned employment with employers other than Great 
Lakes. For instance, Shade testified that he worked for 
Bean-Weeks during a portion of 1994; and Shade provided 
evidence that out of his twenty year career, he worked for 
Great Lakes during the Cape May job and between 
September 1992 and February 1994. From this evidence, it 
is reasonable to conclude that this general work history 
evidence involved other employers beyond Great Lakes. 
Thus, because the evidence of Shade's general work history 
apparently referred to employment with independent 
employers, this testimony clearly was irrelevant to the 
determination of Shade's seaman status, and the district 
court abused its discretion to have permitted the jury to 
consider it.7 
 
The admission of evidence concerning Shade's specific 
work history with Great Lakes poses a more difficult 
question. Typically, an employee introducing evidence of 
connections to other vessels in an employer's fleet under 
the Fleet Seaman Doctrine has worked for the same 
employer on a continual, uninterrupted basis. See, e.g., 
Braniff, 280 F.2d at 525-26. Shade's connections to other 
vessels in Great Lakes' fleet, however, did not concern a 
single employment period. Instead, Shade presented 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Even if Shade's employment prior to 1992 had been with Great Lakes 
our result would be the same, because as we hold below, such 
employment evidence is not admissible if the employment relationship 
was not continuous. 
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evidence of two distinct employment periods with Great 
Lakes in order to establish a substantial connection to a 
vessel in navigation: his final employment with Great Lakes 
from December 9, 1994, until December 30, 1994, and his 
previous employment with the company from September 
1992 until February 1994. Between these two employment 
periods, Shade did not work for Great Lakes, and he had no 
connection to Great Lakes or the vessels in itsfleet. Rather, 
Bean-Weeks employed him. Thus, in this unusual 
situation, we must determine whether the Fleet Seaman 
Doctrine permits Shade to aggregate his prior assignments 
with Great Lakes and his work for the company at the Cape 
May job to establish a substantial connection to a vessel in 
navigation, even though he was not employed continuously 
by Great Lakes. 
 
The Supreme Court's consideration of the substantiality 
prong of the Chandris seaman status test in Harbor Tug, 
520 U.S. 548, 117 S.Ct. 1535, provides some guidance to 
resolve this issue. In that case, John Papai, an employee of 
Harbor Tug & Barge Company, was injured while painting 
a tugboat. See Harbor Tug, 117 S.Ct. at 1538. During the 
2-1/4 years prior to his injury, Papai received various 
assignments with a number of different employers, 
including Harbor Tug, through a central union hiring hall. 
See id. at 1538. In fact, during the 2-1/2 months prior to 
his injury, Harbor Tug had employed Papai on 12 separate 
occasions. See id. at 1542. In attempt to establish a 
substantial connection to a vessel in navigation, Papai 
sought to introduce evidence of his prior employments with 
Harbor Tug and with other employers. See id. at 1540. After 
rejecting the evidence relating to other employers, the Court 
examined Papai's specific employments with Harbor Tug. 
See id. at 1542. Given the fact that Papai described a 
number of these jobs as non-deckhand work, the Court 
held that "it would not be reasonable to infer" that the rest 
of his employments with Harbor Tug were of a seagoing 
nature. Id. Thus, the contacts would not seem to assist 
Papai in establishing seaman status. More importantly, the 
Court stated "[i]n any event, these discrete engagements 
were separate from the one in question, which was the sort 
of `transitory or sporadic' connection to a vessel or group of 
vessels that . . . does not qualify one for seaman status." Id. 
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(citation omitted). Thus, the Court held that these prior 
assignments could not be used to establish seaman status 
because they were separate from Papai's present 
employment. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has addressed 
this question more directly in Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. 
Ratliff, 797 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1986). In that case, Tommy 
Lee Ratliff worked for Patton-Tully Transportation Company 
from 1979 until he quit in May 1980; but he returned to 
the company in September 1980 and worked there until his 
death in March 1981. See id. at 208. Subsequently, his 
mother filed a claim under the Jones Act against the 
company, seeking to recover damages for the death of her 
son. See id. at 209. In evaluating Ratliff 's seaman status, 
the court confronted the question of whether it should 
consider both periods of Ratliff 's employment with Patton- 
Tully, or whether it only should consider Ratliff 's final 
period of employment with the company. The court held 
that it should focus solely on Ratliff 's final period of 
employment, because "the four-month hiatus in Ratliff 's 
employment was a significant break requiring separate 
evaluation of his duties during the re-employment period." 
Id. at 210. Thus, the court upheld the exclusion of evidence 
of a prior employment with the same employer, because the 
employee had not worked for the employer on a continuous 
basis. See also Reeves, 26 F.3d at 1256 ("The key to the 
Fleet Seaman Doctrine is that the seaman maintain the 
employment relationship with the same employer."). 
 
Excluding such evidence is consistent with the Fleet 
Seaman Doctrine. Although the doctrine developed as a 
means to protect employees from losing seaman status 
"when on temporary non-navigable assignments or when 
assignments preclude attachment to one," Reeves, 26 F.3d 
at 1256, the doctrine specifically excludes individuals who 
perform seaman's work on multiple vessels, but do so as 
part of their employment with multiple employers. See 
Harbor Tug, 117 S.Ct. at 1541. The distinction developed in 
part because each new assignment with a different 
employer is distinct from the employee's prior jobs with 
other employers, and "[n]o principled basis" existed to limit 
"which prior employments are considered for determining 
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seaman status." Id. This distinction served the purpose of 
permitting "employers and maritime workers alike" to 
predict the Jones Act status of an employee based on the 
job for which the employer hired the individual, rather than 
based on the prior experiences of the employee with an 
independent employer. Id. 
 
Applying this rationale to a situation where an 
employment relationship is terminated and subsequently 
the employer rehires the employee, the employee's posture 
is more akin to those excluded by the doctrine rather than 
those afforded protection under it. After the termination of 
the employment relationship, the employee severs any 
duties that the employee had towards the employer with 
respect to the performance of the former job. The employee 
does not have any ongoing or regular responsibilities 
relating to the vessels in the former employer'sfleet. Upon 
being rehired, the employee does not recapture that prior 
relationship. Instead, the employee adopts a prospective set 
of duties and responsibilities that may be distinct from the 
employee's former performance, and the connections the 
employee once had to any vessels in the employer'sfleet are 
thus separate from the employee's new status. In effect, the 
employment in the new position could be considered to be 
for an entirely different employer, and as such, evidence of 
the prior employment would have no relevance to the 
employee's later position with the employer. Thus, we hold 
that evidence of an employee's prior assignment with the 
same employer is not admissible under the Fleet Seaman 
Doctrine if those assignments were not part of a continuous 
employment relationship between the employer and 
employee.8 
 
Shade severed all ties with Great Lakes and with his 
prior assignments with the company by working for Bean- 
Weeks. When Shade returned to Great Lakes after 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Conceivably there could be such a short interruption in an otherwise 
continuous employment relationship that it might be reasonable to 
regard the employment as practically continuous and thus to apply the 
Fleet Seaman Doctrine. Here, however, the interruption was not so short, 
and Shade worked for Bean-Weeks in the interim. These facts preclude 
a finding that Great Lakes' employment of Shade was practically 
continuous. 
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approximately ten months, his final employment only 
concerned the Cape May job and his duties during that 
dredging operation. He had no regular responsibilities that 
required him to move from vessel to vessel in Great Lakes' 
fleet; instead, he was hired for a distinct job and only could 
establish a connection to vessels being used at the Cape 
May dredging operation. Thus, because he did not maintain 
a continuous employment relationship with the company, 
the evidence of Shade's prior employment with Great Lakes 
was completely irrelevant to the determination of his 
seaman status, and the district court abused its discretion 
to have admitted this prior employment history into 
evidence. 
 
Because the district court abused its discretion to admit 
Shade's prior employment history into evidence,"we must 
reverse unless we find that its admission was harmless 
error." Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1500. An error is harmless if "it 
is highly probable that the error did not substantially 
affect" the judgment. Id. The issue of seaman status was 
one of the central issues at trial and was the subject of a 
great deal of disputed evidence. The admission of Shade's 
prior work history was significant, because it permitted 
Shade to argue to the jury that he should be considered a 
seaman based on the status he held during his prior 
employment assignments and regardless of his actual 
status at Cape May. During closing arguments, Shade's 
counsel stated: 
 
       [T]he Supreme Court has said that in evaluating the 
       status of an individual, you do not look at what he was 
       doing on the day of the injury, or even at the time of 
       the injury. You look at Mr. Shade's history with this 
       company Great Lakes. 
 
        And if you do that, you will know that Mr. Shade has 
       always been a seaman for Great Lakes . . . . 
 
        And you also know that while he was on the beach 
       [at Cape May] he was called out to perform functions 
       on the sea. That is not necessary for you to find. You 
       can find that he wasn't, and still determine he was a 
       seaman, because, as the records will show, he has 
       worked for Great Lakes for over four years, every time 
       as a seaman, as a deck hand. 
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App. at 849. Because of the centrality of the issue and the 
extremely prejudicial use of this evidence, we cannot say 
that it is highly probable that the error did not affect the 
verdict.9 Therefore, we will reverse the judgment and 
remand this matter for a new trial in a matter consistent 
with this opinion. 
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9. We do not preclude admission of evidence of the character leading to 
the reversal here if the evidence is admitted for a purpose other than to 
establish an employee's seaman status. Of course, in the event that such 
evidence is admitted, the district court should give an appropriate 
instruction as to its use. 
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